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No. 15

House of Representatives

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Reverend H. Dale Crockett, Fountain Memorial Baptist Church, Washington, D.C., offered the following prayer:

Meditation: Philippians 4: 8: Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.

Our Father, we lift up our hearts in gratitude to Thee who hast sustained us in past days of crisis and peril. Humbly we beseech Thee to open our minds this day unto justice, goodness, charity, and truth.

May the Members of this legislative body be blessed by the resources of Thy grace. In this day fraught with confusion, let all those in authority perceive with clarity and act with wisdom to the end that peace may reign among men. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, January 27, 1966, was read and approved.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sundry messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the House by Mr. Ratchford, one of his secretaries.

THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO RENEW BOMBING IN VIETNAM

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, the renewal of the bombing is justified under the circumstances. I support the decision made by President Johnson. It is necessary as a means of preserving American lives and those of our allies who are fighting aggression in South Vietnam. It is also necessary for a future world of peace to stop now the Communist militant aggression that exists. If firm leadership in Europe had existed in the 1930's against Hitler, World War II might well have been averted.

For 37 days there has been suspension in the bombing of North Vietnam. There

has not been the slightest desire or intent on the part of Hanoi to enter into negotiations. Instead, all that has been received is arrogant and defiant statements and actions on the part of the enemy of freedom. It is apparent that Peiping is controlling and directing the North Vietnamese leadership.

The President has clearly stated on any number of occasions his willingness to enter into negotiations to bring about an honorable and just peace. The record is clear justifying the decision made by President Johnson to renew the bombing. This decision is for the best interests of our soldiers and our allies who are fighting for peace, and is in the national interest of our country. All Americans should support President Johnson in his decision.

THE RENEWED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, this morning the U.S. Air Force bombed again selected targets in North Vietnam. Later this morning the President of the United States set forth why this was necessary. He also announced that in his relentless pursuit for a just and honorable peace that the matter would be submitted today, or as soon as feasible, by Ambassador Goldberg, to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Mr. Speaker, I think the Record should show that the Government of the United States has pursued every honorable means to bring this conflict to the conference table. Last year, last spring, the statement was made in many places that if we would simply stop bombing, that the matter would be brought to the conference table. Thereupon the President of the United States made an historic address at John Hopkins University in April 1965. The bombing then stopped for almost a week without any result. The word came back then that the period was not long enough. So, for the past 37 days not one bomb fell on any military target in North Vietnam, to the extent that our military command

complained that our men were there with their arms literally tied behind their backs. During that period Ambassador Harriman, Ambassador Goldberg, Secretary Rusk, Vice President HUMPHREY, and many other men of good will sought again by every conceivable device to bring this matter to the conference table.

On Saturday last Hanoi announced again with cynicism that the only people we could confer with would be the Vietcong—again indicating that any desire for honorable peace was the last thing in their minds.

So, Mr. Speaker, I think the United States and the world understands who wants peace and who wants war. I am convinced that the vast majority of the people of the United States on both sides of the aisle support the action of the President of the United States.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given permission to have printed in the Record at this point a statement made this morning by the President of the United States:)

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 31, 1966.

MY FELLOW AMERICANS: For 37 days, no bombs fell on North Vietnam. During that time we have made a most intense and determined effort to enlist the help and support of all the world to persuade the government in Hanoi that peace is better than war, that talking is better than fighting, and that the road to peace is open. Our effort has met with understanding and support throughout most of the world—but not in Hanoi and Peiping. From those two capitals have come only denunciation and rejection.

In these 37 days, the efforts of our allies have been rebuffed. The efforts of neutral nations have come to nothing. We have sought without success to learn of any response to efforts made by the governments of Eastern Europe. There has been no answer to the enlightened efforts of the Vatican. Our own direct private approaches have been in vain. The answer of Hanoi to all is the answer that was published 3 days ago—they persist in aggression, and they insist on the surrender of South Vietnam to communism.

It is plain that there is no readiness to talk—no readiness for peace—in that regime today.

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And what is plain in words is also plain in acts. Throughout these 37 days—even at moments of truce—there has been continued violence against the people of South Vietnam, against their government, against their soldiers, and against our own American forces.

We do not regret the pause in the bombing.

We yield to none in our determination to seek peace. We have given a full and decent respect to the opinions of those who thought that such a pause might give new hope for peace. Some said 10 days might do it. Others said 20. Now we have paused for twice the time suggested by some who urged it. Now the world knows more clearly than ever before who insists on aggression and who works for peace.

The Vietnamese, American, and allied troops that are engaged in South Vietnam—with increasing strength and increasing success—want peace, I am sure, as much as any of us here at home. But while there is no peace, they are entitled to the full support of American strength and American determination. We will give both.

As constitutional Commander in Chief I have—as I must—given proper weight to the judgment of those responsible for counseling with me: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, my national security adviser, and America's professional military men represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These advisers tell me that if continued immunity is given to all that supports North Vietnam aggression, the cost in lives—Vietnamese, American, and allied—will only be greatly increased. In the light of the words and actions of the government in Hanoi, it is our clear duty to do what we can to limit these costs.

So on this Monday morning in Vietnam, at my direction—after consultation and agreement with the Government of South Vietnam—U.S. aircraft have resumed action in North Vietnam. They struck lines of supply which support the continuing movement of men and arms against the people and Government of South Vietnam.

Our air strikes on North Vietnam from the beginning have been aimed at military targets and controlled with great care. Those who direct and supply the aggression have no claim to immunity from military reply.

The end of the pause does not mean the end of our own pursuit of peace. That pursuit will be as determined and unremitting as the pressure of our military strength on the field of battle. In our continuing pursuit of peace, I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg to ask for an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council. He will present a full report on the situation in Vietnam and a resolution which can open the way to the conference table. This report and this resolution will be responsive to the spirit of the renewed appeal of Pope Paul; that appeal has our full sympathy.

I have asked Secretary Rusk to meet with representatives of the press later this morning, to give to the country and to the world a comprehensive account of the diplomatic effort conducted in these last 5 weeks in our continuing policy of peace and freedom for South Vietnam.

REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG TO PRESIDENT OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL FOR MEETING OF THAT COUNCIL

(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given permission to have printed at this point in the Record a letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to the President of the United Nations Security Council, dated January 31, 1966:)

JANUARY 31, 1966.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to request that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam.

As you know, the U.S. Government has, time and time again, patiently and tirelessly sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict on the basis of unconditional negotiations and the Geneva accords of 1954. We have done so both inside and outside the United Nations.

In President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General, in my letter of July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security Council, and in my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General, we appealed for whatever help in ending the conflict the Security Council and its members or any other organ of the United Nations might be able to give. We have also been in constant touch with the Secretary General in order to keep him fully informed and to seek his counsel and assistance. A great number of U.N. members, acting jointly or separately, have with our earnest encouragement sought to find a means of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

As you are also aware, because my Government was advised by many others that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might contribute to the acceptance by its government of our offer of unconditional negotiations, we did suspend bombing on December 24 and continued that suspension for some 37 days. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to His Holiness the Pope and to the chiefs of state or heads of government of a number of states our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Our views were set forth in 14 points which were communicated to a very large number of governments and later published and which were summarized in the third paragraph of my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General.

I should like to repeat that summary to you as follows:

"That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a ceasefire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples."

Subsequently, the President in his state of the Union address on January 12 reiterated once again our willingness to consider at a conference or in other negotiations any proposals which might be put forward by others. I am authorized to inform the Council that these U.S. views were transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Vietnam and were received by that Government.

Unhappily, there has been no affirmative response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating table, to which so many governments lent their sympathy and assistance. Instead there have been from Hanoi, and, of course, from Peiping as well, merely the familiar charges that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration. The most recent response seemed to be that

set forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to certain heads of state which was broadcast from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his unwillingness at this time to proceed with unconditional negotiations; on the contrary, he insisted on a number of preconditions which would in effect require the United States to accept Hanoi's solution before negotiations had even begun. This is obviously unacceptable.

Therefore, Mr. President, my Government has concluded that it should now bring this problem with all its implications for peace formally before the Security Council. We are mindful of the discussions over the past months among the members of the Council as to whether a formal meeting could usefully be held in the context of other efforts then in train. We are also aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it.

We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less. In this connection, we are mindful of the renewed appeal of His Holiness the Pope only 2 days ago in which he suggested that "an arbitration of the U.N. confined to neutral nations might tomorrow—we would like to hope even today—resolve this terrible question."

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

SECRETARY RUSK'S STATEMENT IN REFERENCE TO PRESIDENT'S EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESUMPTION OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given permission to have printed at this point in the Record a statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in further reference to the announcement made by the President earlier today:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
January 31, 1966.

(The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:)

Secretary Rusk. Earlier this morning President Johnson confirmed that U.S. aircraft have resumed action against the lines of communication which support the continuing movement of men and arms against the people and Government of South Vietnam.

I wish to summarize for you the unprecedented diplomatic effort of the past 40 days—an effort aimed at peace—and the tragically negative response from Hanoi. To understand the full import of the past 40 days you must recall the months and years of unremitting effort by the United States and others to achieve peace in southeast Asia.

We had no assurance at Christmastime that a suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam would move us closer to peace. Hanoi had refused to come to the Security Council of the United Nations in August 1964, in response to an invitation initiated in the Council by the Soviet Union. A call by 17 nonaligned nations for "negotiations

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without preconditions" had been harshly rejected by Hanoi, as was President Johnson's call for unconditional discussions at Baltimore last April. A Commonwealth Committee had been rebuffed. The Secretary General of the U.N. had not been permitted to visit Hanoi and Peiping. Suggestions by the President of India were denounced. The machinery of the Geneva conference was paralyzed by Hanoi's recalcitrance. Contacts with Hanoi and Peiping had failed to disclose a serious interest in peace. A pause in the bombing last May had yielded only a polemical rejection.

Nevertheless, the President decided, on the advice of myself and his other senior advisors, and in agreement with the Government of Vietnam to extend the Christmas pause for a further period. He did so because of America's strong preference for peace in southeast Asia, a desire which takes into full account the decades of suffering and violence inflicted upon the people of Vietnam. He did so because a number of governments, including a number of Communist governments, had insisted that a suspension of the bombing would create a situation in which the possibilities of peace could be greatly improved. He did so because there was unnecessary confusion at home and abroad about where the responsibility lies for the absence of peace—or even of discussions or negotiations about the possibility of peace.

Shortly after Christmas, therefore, we were in touch with all the governments of the world, more than 115 of them, as well as with his Holiness the Pope, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council of NATO, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Six special Presidential envoys visited 34 capitals and personal communications from the President went to the chiefs of government of many more.

Hanoi was informed at any early stage of the suspension of the bombing. They were told that no decision had been made regarding a resumption of bombing and that if Hanoi would reciprocate by making a serious contribution towards peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension. There was no ultimatum, in word or in fact, but rather an invitation to move toward peace. All governments were reminded of the far-reaching suggestions which the United States had made about the possibilities of peace, suggestions which were summarized in the so-called 14 points. It was made clear that, as far as we were concerned, there could be a conference, less formal discussions, or private and tentative contacts through the most discreet channels.

We know that many governments, including Communist governments, were active during this period and that our own direct and indirect contacts were strongly reinforced from many capitals. We were in touch with most governments several times during this period.

It is with genuine regret that I must report that the response has been negative, harsh and unyielding. Channels which had been opened by us, one after the other, yielded no move toward peace. Throughout the period since Christmas, Hanoi and Peiping denounced our efforts toward peace with a continuing barrage of such epithets as "fraud," "trick," "deceit," "swindle," "hoax," "farce." The negative attitudes of Hanoi and the Liberation Front have been clarified in the last few days in an unmistakable fashion. Ho Chi Minh in letters addressed to a number of heads of state stated: "If the United States really wants peace it must recognize the NFL SV as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam and engage in negotiations with it." In a statement released just yesterday, the

front itself said, "All negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are entirely useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Vietnam their troops and all kinds of war materials."

But they made clear their negative view by deeds as well as words throughout the period of suspension of bombing. Infiltrations of men and material from the North into South Vietnam continued at a high level. Acts of violence in South Vietnam itself continued with relatively minor fluctuations at virtually the same record high levels set in the last quarter of 1965. By these acts they made it entirely clear that their purpose remained what it has been from the beginning: namely, to take over South Vietnam by force.

It has been necessary, therefore, for us to meet our responsibilities to our commitments to South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese people. I joined with other senior advisers to the President to recommend to him that he resume the necessary military action to support the South Vietnamese and allied forces and to meet the aggression from the north.

This does not mean that, as far as we are concerned, the search for peace will stop. Far from it. The President told you this morning that the matter is being presented to the Security Council of the United Nations. I will add that the other processes of diplomacy will continue in full operation, publicly and privately, directly and indirectly, in order that any possibility of peace can be explored and tested.

It is possible that one of the obstacles to peace has been a failure on the part of Hanoi to understand that the United States will in fact meet its commitment. It is not easy for a democracy such as ours to prevent such a basic miscalculation on the part of a totalitarian regime. If they are relying upon a military victory in the south, they must abandon that hope. If they are relying on international opinion to divert the United States from its commitment, they must recognize that the world community does not support their aggression. If they are relying upon domestic differences among us to save their cause, they must understand that that will not occur. The way to shorten this war is to make it very clear to Hanoi that the course upon which they are embarked is futile and that if they are prepared to sit down and talk like reasonable men, answers can be found which will relieve both themselves and their brothers in the south of the violence, of which there has been more than enough.

VIETNAM

(Mr. MILLER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate the gentleman from Louisiana and to subscribe fully to the remarks he has just made. It is time that the citizens of this country be counted for or against the action of the President. I, for one, want to be registered in full support of what he has done. The President and his competent advisers are the only ones who know all of the facts. I have never accepted blind political leadership. Every time I have ever run for a new office I have had to buck the so-called organization. But the President is a humanitarian—he is a humanist. He has demonstrated this during the period of time that he has been in office. He knows war and, like the great Franklin Roosevelt, he can say as I do, "I hate war."

I have never been in battle, but for 4 years after World War I, I worked very closely with disabled veterans as an official of the Veterans' Bureau, the forerunner of the present Veterans' Administration. I think I know something of the problems of war and its cost in human suffering and death. I know there are certain groups in this country—extremists, both ends of the political spectrum, who vigorously challenge what is being done today. They represent a small minority and I am certain that all Americans in this critical hour rally behind the action taken by our great President.

POST-KOREAN GI BILL

(Mr. TEAGUE of Texas asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, for years I have tried to work out a post-Korean GI bill which the administration and all the veterans' groups and everybody could agree on. I have learned that this is an impossible thing. So today I am introducing a bill, a post-Korean GI bill that I hope will become law.

This bill provides a permanent program of educational assistance for individuals serving after January 31, 1955, on the basis of a month of training for each month, or fraction thereof, of service not to exceed 36 calendar months, with the rates for full-time training set at \$100 per month for a single veteran, \$125 for a veteran with one dependent, and \$150 for a veteran with more than one dependent, and proportionate rates for less than full time.

Education must be completed within 8 years from the date of discharge.

Educational provisions effective June 1, 1966; other provisions are effective on the date of enactment.

Individuals in the Armed Forces may receive the educational benefits of this act if their service is such as to permit.

Mr. Speaker, the bill also provides for guaranteed and direct loans.

The bill also has some miscellaneous provisions as follows:

It extends presumptions on chronic and tropical diseases, because about 40 percent of the casualties in Vietnam happen because of such diseases.

It grants medical care for non-service-connected veterans.

It provides job counseling and job placement assistance.

It authorizes a flag to drape the casket of veterans of this service.

It grants preference in Federal employment.

And, finally, it amends the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to increase the protection of individuals who are renting homes when they are called into service from the \$80 monthly rental to \$150.

Mr. Speaker, our committee will meet tomorrow and I hope the committee will report out a bill and that it will be passed by both the House and the Senate.

U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

(Mr. COLMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1

minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I frequently find it most difficult, if not impossible, to follow President Johnson on some of his programs of a domestic nature. But on this matter of the war in Vietnam that is so vital to America, to the free world, and particularly to those boys whom we have sent over there to fight in the jungles and the rice paddies, the President could have done nothing less than he did when he announced today the resumption of bombing.

Ever since the cessation of hostilities in World War II, mine has been one of those humble voices in the wilderness which has repeatedly been heard in the well of the House stating that the Communists want neither war nor peace, and that they understand only one language. That language is firmness and force.

Mr. Speaker, this is no time for division in our great common country. As I have repeatedly stated since this Vietnam thing started, the question of whether or not we should be in Vietnam may be a debatable question. But the fact remains that we are there and we must either get all in or get all out. At the risk of being designated with this label that is going around of a "hawk," I do not think there is any halfway method of winning the peace over there. It must be an all-out effort.

We hear a great deal about the fear of bringing Red China or Red Russia into this war. That is a calculated risk that we must take. We cannot go on and on and on permitting our boys to be slaughtered over there, permitting the enemy, under and appeasement policy that has been largely followed ever since the end of World War II, to call the signals while we run the defensive plays. You cannot win a football game that way, you cannot win a diplomatic battle that way, and you cannot win a cold or a hot war that way.

Mr. Speaker, certainly we have learned at least one lesson about the modus operandi of the Communists in the past 20 years. I call attention to the fact that every time we have called their hand, they have backed down. Witness Korea, the first and second Berlin crises, the Formosan Strait, and the Cuban affair to mention some instances. No, Mr. Speaker, the conduct of the Communists throughout the cold war has been to force the free world and particularly America, its chief and strongest foe, to become engaged in a series of brush wars, using their satellites as pawns. But when the chips are down they retreat and provoke trouble in new areas.

What would the appeasers have us do? Would they have us to fight an unlimited Korean type of war with North Vietnam as a sanctuary from which the enemy could advance, slaughter our ground forces and then retreat into their own base of operation with impunity and safety? Would they have this, the most powerful nation on the globe, await the time when Red China, which they parade before us as a mighty dragon, to accumulate sufficient nuclear bombs and perfect the means of delivering these bombs while we follow the appeasement line?

So, as one who has no time for the draft card burners, the appeasers, and those who would divide our country in this great time of peril, I wish to add my humble voice in approval of the stand which the President of the United States took this morning in his announcement of the renewal of the use of air power in support of our beleaguered ground forces.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I hope that the President, as the constitutional Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, will not be swayed by the appeasers and that he will use whatever firmness and force necessary to bring this unfortunate situation to a successful conclusion. I am confident that he will find that an overwhelming majority of the citizens of this great Republic in support of him. But likewise, Mr. Speaker, I express the hope that President Johnson will realize that in such an effort, guns must have preference over butter lest we lose our cherished institutions to other equally as fatal enemies within, particularly ruinous inflation.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, the President has just made one of the most critical, one of the most crucial decisions in American history.

We on our side of the aisle, as those on the other side, in fact all Americans, hope and pray that this decision is the right one.

I know that the President did a great deal of soul-searching in the process at arriving at the action he has taken. I know that his top military and civilian advisers have given him the best information at their disposal. I know they have urged this course of action.

It seems to me, however, that all of us today should be most concerned about the welfare of the 200,000 American military personnel stationed in Vietnam and the many thousands of others stationed in other parts of southeast Asia. They have been sent there to protect our best interests and the Armed Forces have done a superb job under most adverse circumstances. They deserve our strongest support. They will have it.

It seems to me that at this critical juncture in the history of the United States, regardless of our political party affiliation and regardless of any views we may have about whether we should or should not be in Vietnam, it is our major responsibility to stand together, to close our ranks for the security of the Nation. We should pledge ourselves to that end.

WE NEED CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS IN VIETNAM, TOO

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, I support the action of the President in authorizing the resumption of bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. I am

convinced that the overwhelming majority of the Congress and the Nation's populace also support this action. But let me turn to another aspect of the war which I believe deserves consideration. Far more than any other country, the United States is sending her youth and treasure to prevent the takeover of all of Asia by the Communists. Let me hasten to state, the forces of South Vietnam in that country are three times as large and they have fought far longer than we, but they are fighting for their own country. So, what I say is not a reflection, but a commendation on the efforts of the Vietnamese to carry on that nation's long and valiant fight against communism. Nevertheless, the fact is inescapable that other nations of Asia could do much more to help. It is, first of all, a cause which is very definitely their own. Some are helping. Korea is contributing meaningfully in manpower. A division of Korean troops is performing valiantly and they have drawn high praise from American observers.

Other Asian nations have an equal stake in the war. If Vietnam should fall, each Asian country would speedily find itself on the Communist timetable for conquest. United, the non-Communist forces of Asia could effectively withstand any effort by the Communists. But, some are neutral and some have shown Communist sympathies. U.S. State Department and Foreign Service personnel have accomplished material gains by demonstrating to some Asian nations the real perils of communism. There have been marked improvements in the understanding shown and the cooperation extended to the cause of the democracies by Laos and Thailand. It is to be hoped that a similarly positive effort will be made to convince other Asia countries of the folly of a neutralist or standoff attitude toward the wave which threatens in time to engulf them all.

In the field of more immediate prospects for help are the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China. This is because of the presence of well-trained and well-equipped armies in those two countries. I have already stated that the Republic of Korea is participating in a positive way. This is even more commendable since Korea also must recognize the ever-present threat on her northern border from North Korea, or Chinese Communist forces. But, it is well within reason to believe that additional forces can be trained and made available in Korea for use in South Vietnam or to free existing units for service in South Vietnam.

The Republic of China is probably the most fertile source of immediately available troops. The ostensible reason for the lack of participation of these forces is that Red China's feelings toward the Republic of China are so vitriolic that such action might trigger an attack on Formosa or intervention by the Chicom into South Vietnam. Very probably, the existence of Republic of China troops will always help to immobilize a number of Chicoms which conceivably could be used in South Vietnam; however, this advantage, at best, is passive and static.